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Quantum key distribution protocols using entangled state
Jian Wang,∗ Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
We present three quantum key distribution protocols using entangled state. In the first two
protocols, all Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs are used to distribute a secret key except those chosen
for eavesdropping check, because the communication parties measure each of their particles in an
invariable measuring basis. The first protocol is based on the ideal of qubit transmission in blocks.
Although it need quantum memory, its theoretic efficiency approximates to 100%. The second
protocol does not need quantum memory and its efficiency for qubits can achieve 100%. In the third
protocol, we present a controlled quantum key distribution using three-particle entangled state to
solve a special cryptographic task. Only with the controller’s permission could the communication
parties establish their sharing key and the sharing key is secret to the controller. We also analyze
the security and the efficiency of the present protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
promising applications of quantum information science.
The goal of QKD is to allow two legitimate parties, Alice
and Bob, to generate a secret key over a long distance,
in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who interferes
with the signals. The security of QKD is based on the
fundamental laws of physics. Together with the Ver-
nam cipher, QKD can be used for unconditionally secure
communication. Since the BB84 protocol[1], the first
QKD scheme, was published, many variations on QKD
have been subsequently proposed. They can be roughly
classified into “prepare and measure” protocols, such as
BB84, B92[2], the three-state protocol[3], the six-state
protocol[4] and “entanglement based” protocols, such as
E91[5], BBM92[6]. There have been efforts to set a secu-
rity proof based on entanglement for the both classes[7].
Recently, the continuous-variable QKD[8] has also been
proved to be a promising protocol to send secret keys
with high transmission rate.
The efficiency is one of the important parameters of
QKD protocol. Many efforts have been made to improve
the efficiency of QKD protocol. To improve the efficiency
of the BB84 QKD, the scheme in Ref.[9] assigns signifi-
cantly different probabilities for the different polarization
bases during both transmission and reception to reduce
the fraction of discarded data. The actual probabilities
used in their schemes are announced in public. To de-
feat the eavesdropper’s attack to the predominant basis,
it needs a refined analysis of accepted data: they sepa-
rate the accepted data into various subsets according to
the basis employed and estimate an error rate for each
subset individually. In Ref.[10], Hwang, Koh, and Han
proposed a modified BB84 QKD scheme that increases
its efficiency to nearly 100%. However, the communica-
tion parties need a common secret key in their scheme.
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From the point of view of information theory, Cabello[11]
defined the efficiency of a QKD protocol, E ,
E = bs
qt + bt
, (1)
where bs is the number of secret bits received by Bob,
qt, bt is each the number of qubits, classical bits inter-
changed between Alice and Bob during the QKD process.
Here the classical bits used for eavesdrop checking have
been neglected. As has been discussed by Cabello, the
efficiency of BB84, E91, cabello 2000[12], is 25%, 50%,
67%, respectively. Actually, qubit is more expensive than
classical bit. The efficiency equation E (called the total
efficiency) cannot describe the efficiency of QKD protocol
sufficiently. The efficiency for qubits is a useful comple-
ment to analyze the efficiency of QKD protocol, which is
defined as
η =
qu
qt
, (2)
where qu is the useful qubits and qt is the total qubits
transmitted [13]. To evaluate the efficiency of a QKD
protocol, we should combine these two parameters.
In this paper, we present three QKD protocols using
entangled state. The first protocol whose ideal is based
on qubit transmission in blocks uses Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pairs to distribute a secret key. The the-
oretic efficiency of the protocol approximates to 100%,
because all EPR pairs are used to distribute a secret key
except those chosen for checking eavesdroppers. How-
ever, the flaw of the first protocol is that it needs quan-
tum memory during the QKD process. We then present
the second protocol which does not need quantum mem-
ory. In the second protocol, although the total efficiency
is 50%, the efficiency for qubits approaches 100%. To
solve a special cryptographic task, we propose a con-
trolled QKD protocol. The two communication parties
can only generate their sharing key with the permission
2of the controller. This protocol can also be used to dis-
tribute a secret key among three parties. The three pro-
tocols are unconditionally secure.
G. L. Long and X. S. Liu proposed an efficient high-
capacity QKD scheme[14] whose efficiency can achieve
100%. In their scheme, a set of ordered N EPR pairs is
used as a data block for distributing secret key. Based
on the ideal of block transmission, we present another
QKD protocol whose efficiency can also achieve 100%.
The security of the present protocol is ensured by the
random Hadamada transformation. Our protocol is as
follows:
Protocol 1:
(1) Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pairs in the Bell
state
|φ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)AB. (3)
We denotes the ordered N EPR pairs with
{[P1(A),P1(B)], [P2(A),P2(B)], · · · , [PN (A),PN (B)]},
where the subscript indicates the pair order in the
sequence, and A, B represents the two particles of EPR
pair, respectively. Alice takes one particle from each
EPR pair to form an ordered EPR partner particle
sequence [P1(A), P2(A),· · · , PN(A)], called A sequence.
The remaining EPR partner particles compose B se-
quence, [P1(B), P2(B),· · · , PN (B)]. Alice transmits the
B sequence to Bob.
(2) To prevent eavesdropping, Bob selects randomly
a sufficiently large subset of B sequence and performs
Hadamard transformations on them. He then announces
publicly the position of the selected particles. The
Hadamard transformation is crucial for the security of
the scheme as we will see in the sequel.
(3) After hearing from Bob, Alice executes Hadamard
transformations on the corresponding particles of A se-
quence.
(4) Note that
|φ+〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)AB, (4)
where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). The
two parties’ Hadamada transformations will not change
the initial state. Alice then measures the A sequence in
Z-basis {|0〉, |1〉}. Bob measures the B sequence in the
same basis as Alice. Thus they established sharing key.
In this step, they can also measure each of their particles
in X-basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
(5) Alice and Bob then publicly compare the results of
these measurements to check eavesdropping. Bob chooses
randomly a sufficiently large subset of his results and
announces them publicly. Alice compares Bob’s results
with her corresponding results. She can thus find out
whether there is an eavesdropper. If too many of these
measurements disagree, they abort the protocol. If they
are certain that there is no eavesdropping, Alice and Bob
utilize privacy amplification and error correction to distil
the final key.
We now discuss the security and the efficiency of pro-
tocol 1. The crucial point is that the Hadamard transfor-
mations at the step 2 and 3 of the protocol do not allow
Eve to have a successful attack and Eve’s attack will be
detected during the eavesdropping check. The protocol
1 is similar to the modified Lo-Chau protocol [15], but
the protocol 1 does not need classical message except
that used for eavesdropping check. The security of the
protocol 1 is the same as the modified Lo-Chau proto-
col which is proved unconditionally secure. According to
the information-theoretic efficiency defined by Cabello,
the total efficiency of protocol 1 can be made asymp-
totically close to 100%. Here the classical bits used for
eavesdrop checking have been neglected. The efficiency
for qubit can also achieve 100% because all EPR pairs
are used to distribute a sharing key except those used to
check eavesdropping.
Although the protocol 1 is efficient, it is necessary for
the protocol to use quantum memory. We then present
another QKD protocol without quantum memory.
Protocol 2:
(1) Alice prepares randomly an EPR pair in one of the
following states
|φ±〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉)AB, (5)
where the subscripts A, B represents the two particles of
EPR pairs. Alice then send the particle B to Bob.
(2) After hearing from Bob, Alice publishes the infor-
mation of the initial state she prepared. If the initial
state is |φ−〉, both Alice and Bob perform Hadamard
transformation on each of their corresponding particle.
Otherwise, they do nothing. After Hadamada transfor-
mation, |φ−〉 is changed to
|φ−1 〉AB =
1√
2
(|++〉 − | − −〉)AB, (6)
(3) After doing this, Alice and Bob measure their cor-
responding particles in X-basis. They agree that |+〉
(|−〉) corresponds to bit “0” (“1”).
(4) The parties repeat the above steps N times and
generate N raw secret keys.
(5) To check eavesdropping, Alice selects randomly a
sufficiently large subset of her measurement results and
tells it to Bob. Bob publishes his measurement results
of the sampling particles. Alice then evaluates the error
rate of the QKD process. If the error rate exceeds the
threshold, they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they uti-
lize privacy amplification and error correction to distil a
final key.
We then analyze the security and the efficiency of
protocol 2. Firstly, the protocol is secure against the
intercept-resend attack by Eve. In this attack, Eve inter-
cepts the particle B and makes measurement on it, then
she resends a particle to Bob according to her measure-
ment result. Eve can only intercept the particle B at
the step 1 of the protocol and she cannot make certain
3which particle will be executed Hadamard transforma-
tion. Thus Eve can only measure the intercepted parti-
cle in Z-basis or X-basis randomly. Suppose Eve mea-
sures the intercepted particle which belongs to |φ+〉 in
Z-basis. If the result of Eve’s measurement is “0”, she
sends a particle in the state |+〉 to Bob, otherwise sends a
particle in the state |−〉. Then the state of the two parti-
cles collapses to |0+〉
AB
or |1−〉
AB
each with probability
1/2. Thus the error rate introduced by Eve will achieve
50%. During the eavesdropping check, Eve’s attack will
be detected. Suppose Eve performs X-basis measure-
ment on the intercepted particle which belongs to |φ−〉.
Then the state of the two particles collapses to |+−〉
AB
or | −+〉
AB
each with probability 1/2. After Hadamada
transformation, the state is changed to |01〉
AB
or |10〉
AB
.
The error rate introduced by Eve will also achieve 50%.
Secondly, the protocol is safe against collective attack.
In this strategy, Eve intercepts the particle B and uses
it and her own ancillary particle in the state |0〉 to do a
CNOT operation (the particle B is the controller, Eve’s
ancillary particle is the target). Then Eve resends the
particle B to Bob. However, Eve has no information of
the initial state. Suppose the initial state is
|φ−〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)AB. (7)
After Eve’s collective attack, the state of the particle A,
B and Eve’s ancillary particle becomes
|Ω1〉ABE =
1√
2
(|+−1〉+ | −+0〉)ABE , (8)
where the subscript E indicates Eve’s ancillary parti-
cle. According to the protocol, Alice and Bob perform
Hadamada transformations on their corresponding par-
ticles, obtaining
|Ω2〉ABE =
1√
2
(|011〉+ |100〉)ABE . (9)
Obviously, Eve’s eavesdropping will be detected during
the eavesdropping check because half of Bob’s results will
be inconsistent with that of Alice’s. As we described
above, the total error rate introduced by Eve is 25%.
Actually, the security of the protocol 2 is equal to that
of the modified Lo-Chau protocol. We can also give a
Shor-Preskill-type proof to protocol 2.
In the protocol 2, the efficiency for qubits is 100% be-
cause all EPR pairs are used to generate a key except
those chosen for eavesdropping check. It is not necessary
for the protocol 2 to use quantum memory. However, it
needs a bit of classical message to generate a bit of shar-
ing key. Therefor the total efficiency of the protocol 2 is
50%. Certainly, we should pay more attention to the ef-
ficiency for qubits because qubit is more expensive than
classical bit.
Han et al. proposed a controlled QKD scheme with
three-particle entanglement [16]. According to their
scheme, the Eq. 1 of their scheme should be
|ABC〉 = 1
2
(|HHH〉+ |HV V 〉+ |V HV 〉 − |V V H〉)
=
1
2
[|H〉(|HH〉+ |V V 〉)
+|V 〉(|HV 〉 − |V H〉)] (10)
Suppose Bob intercepts the two photons which Alice
sends to Bob and Carol. He then performs Bell ba-
sis measurement on the intercepted photons and obtains
|φ+〉 and |ψ−〉 each with probability 1/2. Bob will obtain
Alice’s measurement result and his action will not be de-
tected by Alice. Bob then resends one of the intercepted
particles to Carol. According to their scheme, Bob and
Carol can establish sharing key without the control of
Alice. To solve this problem, we propose another con-
trolled QKD protocol. Suppose only Alice can prepare
the entangled state. Bob and Charlie can only generate
their sharing key under the control of the controller Al-
ice. Without Alice’s permission, Bob and Charlie cannot
establish their sharing key. Certainly, the sharing key is
secret to Alice.
Protocol 3:
(1) Alice prepares a three-particle entangled state in
the state
|Ψ1〉ABC =
1√
2
(|0 + 0〉+ |1− 1〉)ABC (11)
or
|Ψ2〉ABC =
1√
2
(|0− 0〉+ |1 + 1〉)ABC (12)
randomly. She then sends the particle B, C to Bob and
Charlie, respectively.
(2) After confirming that Bob and Charlie have re-
ceived their particles, Alice measures the particle A in Z-
basis or X-basis randomly. She then publishes his mea-
suring basis. If Alice performed Z-basis measurement,
Bob measures the particle B in the X-basis and Charlie
performs Z-basis measurement on the particle C. If Alice
performs X-basis measurement, Bob (Charlie) performs
Z-basis (X-basis) measurement on his particle.
(3) The parties repeat the above steps N times and
each obtains N measurement results. The value of N
is large enough to check eavesdropping, but not enough
to generate a key which is long enough to ensure the
security of cryptography. To generate a secure key, the
parties should run the protocol twice at least.
(4) Alice chooses randomly a sufficiently large subset of
her measurement results and announces the positions of
the sampling particles publicly. She let Bob and Charlie
publish their measurement results of the sampling parti-
cles. Note that
|Ψ1〉ABC =
1√
2
[|+〉(|0+〉+ |1−〉)
+|−〉(|0−〉+ |1+〉)]ABC (13)
4and
|Ψ2〉ABC =
1√
2
[|+〉(|0+〉 − |1−〉)
+|−〉(|0−〉 − |1+〉)]ABC . (14)
They can make certain whether there exists eavesdrop-
ping by comparing their measurement results. If Bob
performs Bell basis measurement on the particle B and
C, his action will also be detected by Alice. If there is
no eavesdropping, they continue to the next step. Oth-
erwise, the protocol is halted.
(5) If Alice permits Bob and Charlie to establish their
sharing key, she publishes her measurement results of the
particles on which she performed X-basis measurements.
The parties let |0〉, |+〉 correspond to binary “0” and |1〉,
|−〉 correspond to binary “1”. If Alice’s measurement
result is |+〉, Bob and Charlie obtains a identical raw
key “0” or “1”. If Alice’s measurement result is |−〉,
Bob or Charlie should invert the bit value of the key to
obtain a identical key. Obviously, the key is secret to
the controller Alice. If Alice, Bob and Charlie want to
establish a three-party key, it only needs Alice to publish
the initial state of the particles on which Alice performed
Z-basis measurement. If the initial state is |Ψ2〉, Bob
should invert his bit of the key. They can also distil a
final key using privacy amplification and error correction.
We now discuss the security of the protocol 3. The two
state |Ψ1〉, |Ψ2〉 which are prepared randomly by Alice,
ensure that Bob and Charlie cannot establish sharing key
without Alice’s permission. Suppose Bob intercepts the
particle B and C and performs Bell basis measurement
on the intercepted particles. Note that
|0+〉+ |1−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉+ |01〉+ |10〉)
|0−〉+ |1+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉 − |01〉+ |10〉)
|0+〉 − |1−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉+ |01〉 − |10〉)
|0−〉 − |1+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉 − |01〉 − |10〉). (15)
According to the Eq. 13 and 14, Bob cannot make certain
the state of the particle B, C. He also has no informa-
tion of Alice’s result. During the eavesdropping check,
his action will be detected by Alice. Alice then stops the
protocol. Because the parties have run the protocol only
once, Bob and Charlie cannot generate a secure shar-
ing key even if they obtained some random EPR pairs.
Without regard to the special cryptographic task, the se-
curity of the present protocol can be reduced to that of
the BBM92 protocol because the parties measure their
corresponding particles in Z-basis or X-basis randomly.
To improve the efficiency of the protocol 3, we can use
the same method of the Ref. [16], which Alice measures
her particle in the Z-basis (X-basis) with probabilities ε
(1 − ε), where 0 < ε ≤ 1. Obviously, it needs a refined
data analysis to ensure the security of the protocol.
In summary, we propose three QKD protocols with en-
tangled state. It is not necessary for the protocol 1 and
protocol 2 to use alternative measuring basis. Thus all
EPR pairs of the two protocols are used to generate a se-
cret key except those chosen for eavesdropping. By using
block transmission, the total efficiency of the protocol 1
can achieve 100% but it needs quantum memory. The
protocol 2 does not need quantum memory and the ef-
ficiency for qubits is 100% because the parties measure
their particles in an invariable measuring basis. But the
total efficiency of the protocol 2 is 50% for the use of clas-
sical bit. In view of the fact that qubit is more expensive
than classical bit, more attention should be paid to the
efficiency for qubits. The protocol 3 is a controlled QKD
protocol which can be applied to a special cryptographic
task. Bob and Charlie establish their sharing key under
the control of Alice. Only with Alice’s permission could
Bob and Charlie generate an identical key. The protocol
3 is multifunctional, which can also be used to distribute
a key among three parties. It is appropriate for QKD
network.
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